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Published: Updated: 
4 min read

DMA's First Test Fails as Apple's Fee Complexity Defeats EU Competition

Setapp Mobile's shutdown reveals how regulatory intent (open markets) collapses against implementation friction. First major alternative app store exits, signaling DMA's structural design failure and Apple's gatekeeping through complexity.

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  • Setapp Mobile shuts down citing Apple's 'still-evolving and complex business terms' under EU Digital Markets Act compliance

  • The core barrier: Apple's Core Technology Fee (€0.50 per install over 1M annually) plus continuously changing terms make subscription-model app stores mathematically unviable

  • For investors, this signals alternative app store bets in EU are now high-risk; for enterprises, distribution strategies built on DMA alternatives need immediate revision

  • Watch for Epic Games Store and AltStore responses—if the remaining alternatives begin to struggle with same fee pressures, DMA's entire market-opening premise collapses

The Digital Markets Act promised to crack open Europe's app store monopoly. Eighteen months in, Setapp Mobile, one of the first funded alternatives, is pulling the plug on February 16th. The reason isn't technical failure or user adoption—it's Apple's deliberately complex fee structure that makes alternative stores economically unviable. This isn't a startup struggling. This is regulatory architecture failing against corporate friction strategies.

Setapp Mobile launched in September 2024 as the test case for whether the EU's Digital Markets Act could actually force open Apple's walled garden. The Ukrainian company MacPaw saw an opening: offer EU consumers access to dozens of productivity, finance, and creative apps through a single €9.99 monthly subscription. Simple model, clear value proposition, backed by real funding and 16 years of desktop app credibility.

That lasted 16 months.

The company announced its shutdown without drama, but read between the lines in their statement: "still-evolving commercial conditions... determined that it is not viable to continue." Translation: Apple's compliance terms crushed the math. Not because the DMA failed to open the door, but because Apple weaponized complexity to make the door economically impassable.

Here's the mechanism. Apple's Core Technology Fee charges €0.50 for each first-year install exceeding one million per app annually. On paper, reasonable. In practice? For a subscription model like Setapp's, where the entire business model depends on bundled access to multiple apps, those fees stack. Each app crossing the threshold triggers charges. The fees don't simplify—they compound. And they keep changing. Apple revised its EU fee structure in 2025 specifically to comply with DMA pressure, and instead of reducing complexity, it added more layers.

MacPaw's statement is careful not to blame Apple directly—regulatory subtlety matters when you're still operating other businesses on Apple's platform. But that was the real message: constantly evolving terms mean Setapp couldn't forecast costs, couldn't build stable pricing, couldn't scale the subscription model. Planning becomes impossible when the ground rules change quarterly.

This is how regulatory arbitrage becomes regulatory capture. The DMA mandated interoperability and alternative distribution. Apple complied by creating a compliance framework so intricate that building a viable business within it requires constant legal reinterpretation. Not explicit blocking—friction so elaborate that alternatives simply can't sustain the operational overhead.

Compare this to the previous wave of platform disruption. When Netflix disrupted rental, Blockbuster faced a single, clear economic problem: streaming was cheaper for consumers. When AWS disrupted datacenters, enterprises faced a simple choice: economies of scale favored cloud. But Setapp faced something different—not a market loss but a governance puzzle that shifts monthly. That's harder to compete against than honest market pressure.

The timing matters too. Setapp gave up not because users rejected the service, but because the financial model became impossible during year two, which is exactly when scaling would occur. This is the critical inflection: alternative app stores don't fail on day one when compliance costs are an unknown. They fail on day 400 when those costs become known and unpredictable. By then, momentum is gone.

What's striking is who remains. Epic Games Store and AltStore are still operating, but Epic has the Fortnite revenue engine to absorb EU compliance costs that Setapp didn't. AltStore operates through technical workarounds—literally an alternative to app distribution rather than an alternative app store. Neither proves the DMA worked. Both prove that without revenue from outside the EU market, surviving Apple's fee structure is nearly impossible.

The regulation's architects anticipated financial barriers. That's why the DMA included provisions requiring "fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory" terms. But Apple's genius was making the terms simultaneously fair (they're applied equally), reasonable (€0.50 per install seems defensible), and non-discriminatory (anyone can pay them)—while remaining impossible to sustain a business around for anyone without external capital.

For the EU regulators, this is a validation moment they won't acknowledge. The DMA opened the technical door to alternatives. Apple's response converted technical access into economic impassability. From a regulatory standpoint, you can't force business viability—you can only force market access. Setapp had market access. What they lacked was an economic model that survives the friction of compliance.

The second test comes now. If Epic's app store begins reporting the same viability pressures within 12 months, or if other funded alternatives don't emerge, then the DMA hasn't created competition—it's created the appearance of options while market forces remain as consolidated as before. The difference is the burden of proof shifts. Before DMA, "we're a monopoly" was a descriptive fact. Post-DMA with Setapp shutdown, "alternatives are unviable" becomes the real claim needing regulatory response.

Setapp Mobile's shutdown marks the inflection point where EU regulatory intent (market opening) meets implementation reality (gatekeeping through complexity). This isn't a regulation failure yet—it's a design vulnerability. The DMA forced technical interoperability; Apple responded with economic friction. For investors betting on EU app store alternatives, the window for viable entry is closing unless the next generation finds a revenue model outside Apple's fee structure. For decision-makers evaluating alternative distribution in EU, Setapp's exit signals the game has shifted from building better services to navigating Byzantine compliance frameworks. Watch whether Epic's app store or new entrants begin reporting similar pressures within the next 18 months. If they do, EU regulators must move from forcing market access to forcing business viability—a regulatory scope creep they may not be prepared to handle.

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